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ABSTRACT
Privacy settings are a crucial part of any online social network as users are 
confronted with determining which and how many profile attributes to disclose. Re­
vealing more attributes increases users’ chances of finding friends and yet leaves users 
more vulnerable to dangers such as identity theft. In this dissertation, we consider 
the problem of finding the optimal strategy for the disclosure of user attributes in 
social networks from a game-theoretic perspective.
We model the privacy settings’ dynamics of social networks with three game- 
theoretic approaches. In a two-user game, each user selects an ideal number of at­
tributes to disclose to each other according to a utility function. We extend this 
model with a basic evolutionary game to observe how much of their profiles users 
are comfortable with revealing, and how this changes over time. We then consider 
a weighted evolutionary game to investigate the influence of attribute importance, 
benefit, risk and the network topology on the users’ attribute disclosure behavior.
The two-user game results show how one user’s privacy settings are influenced 
by the settings of another user. The basic evolutionary game results show that the 
higher the motivation to reveal attributes, the longer users take to stabilize their 
privacy settings. Results from the weighted evolutionary game show that: irrespective 
of risk, users are more likely to reveal their most important attributes than their 
least important attributes; when the users’ range of influence is increased, the risk
factor plays a smaller role in attribute disclosure; the network topology exhibits a 
considerable effect on the privacy in an environment with risk.
Motivation and risk are identified as important factors in determining how 
efficiently stability of privacy settings is achieved and what settings users will adopt 
given different parameters. Additionally, the privacy settings are affected by the 
network topology and the importance users attach to specific attributes. Our models 
indicate that users of social networks eventually adopt profile settings that provide the 
highest possible privacy if there is any risk, despite how high the motivation to reveal 
attributes is. The provided models and the gained results are particularly important 
to social network designers and providers because they enable us to understand the 
influence of different factors on users’ privacy choices.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Concerns regarding the privacy in social networks have received worldwide 
attention and led to frequent public debates [1 , 2 ]. Social networks contain large 
amounts of information that can be used uniquely to identify their users as well as 
provide information on their habits, interests, and history [3]. On the positive side, the 
information enables the users to identify potential new “friends” and find old friends 
[4]. However, revealing information also makes it accessible to potential criminals, 
leaving the users vulnerable to dangers such as identity theft, sexual predators, 
stalkers, and inference by defrauders [19]. The risk to user privacy has caused so much 
concern that over 60% of social network users employ privacy increasing measures such 
as deleting friends and concealing profile attributes from other social network users 
[20]. The benefits and risks create a dilemma that every user of a social network faces: 
reveal more attributes to attract more friends, or reveal less attributes and become 
less vulnerable.
A considerable amount of research has been done in understanding online 
social networks and the factors that contribute towards their success. Online social 
networks are built on the concept of self-disclosure [2 1 ], which is positively affected
1
2by factors like relationship-building and platform enjoyment. In contrast, perceived 
privacy risk is a factor with a negative effect on self-disclosure [21]. The benefit 
of relationship-building is linked to the number of friends a user stands to gain by 
disclosing personal information. The link between number of potential friends and 
revealed information is based on the homophily principle more commonly expressed as 
“birds of a feather flock together” [22]. In the context of a social network, this principle 
translates to users with similar attributes being more likely to establish a friendship 
[22, 23]. On top of the similarity in attributes, the number of revealed attributes also 
positively affects relationship-building. Lampe et al. [24] find that the number of 
friends that a user has is exponentially related to the size of the set of attributes that 
the user reveals. This is because sharing more profile attributes allows more users 
to establish common ground that promotes interaction and encourages “friendship” 
[25]. However, profile disclosing increases the privacy risk to social network users [2 1 ]. 
Profile disclosing is defined as the amount of a user’s profile that is visible to a third 
party [2 1 , 26].
Therefore, each user in a social network weighs both the risks and benefits to 
determine how many profile attributes to reveal. Additionally, the privacy setting of 
one user affects the choice of privacy setting of another user. However, little work 
has been done to show how all these factors are linked together. Consequently, there 
is a need to model the interaction of users in a generic social network to understand 
how privacy risk and relationship-building both influence the level of self-disclosure 
exhibited in that network. Such a model would be invaluable in predicting the general 
preference of users when it comes to privacy in social networks.
3Game theoretic models have been applied to online social networks before. 
Squicciarini et al. [27] present a general sum game involving a user and a server to 
explore the dynamics of user registration in social networks. The model and the results 
show that most users agree to provide their personal information during registration 
if the service provider promises to protect the users’ privacy.
Evolutionary games have also been applied to social networks. Using the 
results from a survey, Squicciarini et al. [28] build an evolutionary game theoretical 
model aimed at optimizing the users’ long-term utility. Additionally, by investigating 
the evolutionary game dynamics, they discover that social capital gained from self­
disclosure influences a user’s decisions more than the risk to that user’s privacy.
The profile attribute privacy problem is similar to  the stag-hunt gam e which  
exhibits both pure and mixed Nash equilibria [29]. The stag-hunt game is a two- 
player two-strategy game that captures the conflict between cooperation and safety 
involved in a situation where a hunter selects whether to hunt a stag or a hare without 
prior knowledge of another hunter’s choice. This game reaps the maximum benefit 
to both players if both players select to hunt a stag and there is maximum risk 
to one player if the other player selects otherwise. This situation is similar to the 
privacy in social networks between two players because maximum benefit is accrued 
if both players cooperate and reveal all their attributes. Maximum risk occurs to a 
user when the other user reveals less attributes because this leaves the more revealed 
user vulnerable to identity inference. However, the profile attribute privacy problem 
is different from the stag-hunt game because the privacy problem involves multiple 
players, and multiple strategies (options) in their privacy.
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Other works have also employed game theoretic models to capture the relation 
and coordination between different user properties in different networks in a variety 
of applications. The networks range from online video sharing social networks [30] 
to mobile ad-hoc networks [31], and anonymous social networks [32]. The modeled 
applications include sharing co-owned pictures in a social network [33] and stimulating 
cooperation in the network [30]. In most of these works [30, 34], a two party model 
is captured and used as a basis to create a model that captures the dynamics of 
the entire network. This is because the networks can be looked at as a collection 
of multiple two party interactions. We employ this same reasoning when designing 
models to capture the interaction of a user’s privacy in a social network.
In this dissertation, we propose three gam e-theoretic m odels to  study the  
dynamics of privacy settings between users in a social network. These models include 
a two-user model and two evolutionary game models and are built on a novel analytical 
definition of risk and motivation in a social network.
The two-user game models the interactions between two users in both risk-free 
and risk-included scenarios. We use this model to understand how the privacy choices 
of one user affect the privacy choices of another user. For example, given a network 
in which Alice and Bob are “friends” with an identical number of profile attributes, 
the two-user game investigates whether a strategy by Alice to withhold 30% of her 
attributes would make Bob withhold or reveal more of his attributes.
The evolutionary game is an extension of the two-user game to model the 
interactions of multiple users over time with the utility function of the evolutionary 
game derived from the utility function of the two user game. In the basic evolutionary
5game, all the users are allowed to change their strategy over time in order to maximize 
the benefit of friendship establishment and minimize the risk to their privacy. The 
users’ choice of strategy at any point in time is dependent on the strategies currently 
employed by all the users in the network. Informally, given that Alice is part of a 
large social network, the evolutionary game investigates whether she would change 
her decision to withhold 30% of her attributes if she knew that 60% of the network’s 
users were revealing all their attributes. The evolutionary game also investigates 
whether and how her new privacy strategy would affect the rest of the network users. 
This iterative process is repeated until the entire population reaches an equilibrium 
state. The equilibrium states as well as the dynamics of the network provide insights 
into understanding the privacy preferences of social network users.
The weighted evolutionary model also considers different types of networks 
and different types (weights) of attributes. This model investigates two concepts. 
Firstly, it investigates what influence, if any, the type of network has on the privacy 
strategy of the users of the network given the benefit of friendship enhancement. The 
network types considered include random networks, scale-free networks, and small- 
world networks to model different social network properties [35]. For example, given 
Alice is the popular girl in the social network and is a friend to everyone, this model 
investigates whether her strategy to withhold 30% of her attributes affects other users’ 
strategies as much as Bob’s decision, given he is less popular with only two friends 
in that network. Secondly, this model investigates whether the importance of the 
revealed and hidden attributes play a role in the decision. By weighing the attributes, 
this model considers the possibility that some attributes have a higher impact than
others in either self-disclosure or privacy. This model investigates whether Alice 
revealing attributes such as her religion and sexual preferences would affect the 
network more than her revealing that she likes playing soccer and watching movies.
1.2 Dissertation Contributions
In this dissertation, we present the Nash equilibria [36] for the proposed two- 
user game model as well as the population dynamics for the evolutionary models. 
In our models, the Nash equilibrium refers to the optimal strategies taken by the 
users of the network. The strategies are optimal because the users cannot achieve a 
higher benefit by unilaterally changing their strategy. We also present the population 
dynamics for the evolutionary game showing the popularity of different strategies as 
different users change their privacy over time.
1. For the two-user game, we find that the pure strategy is for at least one of the 
players to disclose no attributes at all if there is an element of risk. Surprisingly, 
removing the risk element does not mean that all players will disclose all their 
attributes.
2. For the basic evolutionary game, we discover that the dominant strategy is to 
disclose no attributes if there is an element of risk. By dominant strategy, we 
refer to the strategy employed by most of the users in the social network. On 
the other hand, if the risk factor is ignored, the dominant strategy is to disclose 
all attributes. Revealing all but one attributes is also a common initial strategy 
in a risk-free network. Additionally, we find that networks where the risk factor 
is considered achieve equilibria faster than networks where risk was ignored.
7Our results indicate that users will only be satisfied with the maximum privacy 
setting regardless of the motivation and benefits of less private settings as long 
as there is an element of risk in the social network.
3. Using the weighted evolutionary game model, we observe a tendency by users to 
reveal their most important attributes more than their less important attributes. 
By important attributes, we refer to those attributes which have a larger impact 
on the privacy as well as the social capital of a user. Additionally, users in 
random and scale-free networks are more likely to reveal their attributes than 
users in small-world networks. Interestingly, we find that the type of network 
topology has a limited effect on privacy settings of a social network in the risk­
free case and yet have a considerable effect on the privacy in the risk-included 
scenario.
1.3 D efinitions and Terminology
In this section we define the various terminologies that are central to the 
methodology used in this dissertation. Some of these terms are further described 
when they are first used in the dissertation.
Game: An interaction between rational, mutually aware players, where the 
payoffs of some players are influenced by the decisions of others [5].
A ttribu te: A field in a user’s online social network profile. The importance of 
an attribute to a user is linked to the benefit gained from its revelation to other 
users in the network.
8Benefit: In the two-user and basic evolutionary games, the benefit is captured 
by the expected number of potential friends that a user can make. In the 
weighted evolutionary game, the benefit is captured by the enhancement of a 
“friendship”. We quantify this enhancement using the number and importance 
of attributes that a user shares with the neighbors.
Identity: The complete set of all profile attribute values of a user in a social 
network that differentiate that user from any other user in the network. 
Motivation: A factor that captures the incentive for users to disclose profile 
attributes and affects benefit.
Privacy settings: A configuration of the social network users’ profile informa­
tion to enable or disable the visibility of certain profile attributes.
Risk (Privacy risk): The probability of a user’s identity being inferred. It is 
inversely related to the number of the users who disclose the same attributes or 
additional attributes.
Strategy: A set of actions that players can follow. The strategy in two-user 
and basic evolutionary game models refers to how many attributes should be 
disclosed. In the weighted evolutionary game model, the strategy refers to which 
and how many attributes should be disclosed.
Utility: A quantity which represents the players’ preference of a certain strategy. 
In our game model, utility includes benefit (positive utility) and risk (negative 
utility).
9Random network: A network that is obtained by randomly sampling from a 
collection of networks which are constructed by the same amount of edges and 
vertices.
Small-world network: A mathematical graph where most nodes can be 
reached by other nodes in a small number of hops even though most of the 
nodes are not adjacent to each other.
Scale-free network: A network whose degree distribution follows the power 
law.
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
In Chapter 2, we discuss the various past works which relate to privacy settings 
of online social networks and game theoretic models in this dissertation. We describe 
our game-theoretic models and specify the definition and strategies used in the models 
in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we provide theoretical analysis for the models. We then 
present the results and highlight the significance of our approach in Chapter 5 and 
conclude this dissertation with a discussion of our findings in Chapter 6 .
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A considerable amount of research has been done in understanding online 
social networks and the factors that contribute towards their success. Online social 
networks are built on the concept of self-disclosure [2 1 ], which is positively affected 
by factors like relationship-building and platform enjoyment. In contrast, perceived 
privacy risk is a factor with a negative effect on self-disclosure [21]. The benefit 
of relationship-building is linked to the number of friends a user stands to gain by 
disclosing personal information. The link between the number of potential friends and 
revealed information is based on the homophily principle more commonly expressed 
as “birds of a feather flock together” [22]. In the context of a social network, this 
principle translates to users with similar attributes being more likely to establish a 
friendship [22, 23].
On top of the similarity in attributes, the number of revealed attributes also 
positively affects relationship-building. Lampe et al. [24] find that the number of 
friends that a user has is exponentially related to the size of the set of attributes that 
the user reveals. This is because sharing more profile attributes allows more users 
to establish common ground that promotes interaction and encourages “friendship” 
[25]. However, profile disclosing increases the privacy risk to social network users [21].
10
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Profile disclosing is defined as the amount of a user’s profile that is visible to a third 
party [2 1 , 26].
Therefore, each user in a social network weighs both the risks and benefits to 
determine how many profile attributes to reveal. Additionally, the privacy settings 
of one user affect the choice of privacy settings of another user. However, little work 
has been done to show how all these factors are linked together. Consequently, there 
is a need to model the interaction of users in a generic social network to understand 
how privacy risk and relationship-building both influence the level of self-disclosure 
exhibited in that network. Such a model would be invaluable in predicting the general 
preference of users when it comes to privacy in social networks.
Game theory is the analysis of situations involving conflicts of interest using 
mathematical models [14]. Each participant is referred to as a player, and each 
player has a set of possible strategies they can employ to achieve their goals. Each 
player’s utility is jointly determined by the strategies chosen by all the players in the 
game. Game theory is a growing field that has been applied to many areas including 
various aspects of online social networks. These aspects range from modeling network 
formation [13], to community detection [15], and discovering influential nodes [16].
Game theoretic models have been applied to online social networks before. 
Using results from a survey, Squicciarini et al. [28] built an evolutionary game 
theoretic model aimed at optimizing the users’ long-term utility. Additionally, by 
investigating the evolutionary game dynamics, they discovered that social capital 
gained from self-disclosure influences a user’s decisions more than the risk to that 
user’s privacy.
12
In [6, 7], we apply a weighted evolutionary game to model privacy settings of 
an online social network. This model captures the relative importance of profile 
attributes by assigning different weights to different attributes. The model also 
considers different types of network topologies. We discover that network connectivity 
and attribute importance have an effect on the disclosure of profile attributes.
In [8 ], in addition to the weighted evolutionary game, we investigate the one- 
to-one interplay in selecting the strategies on privacy settings by employing a two-user 
game. We also explore the influence of a motivation factor on the population dynamics 
by a basic evolutionary game.
The profile attribute privacy problem is similar to the stag-hunt game which 
exhibits both pure and mixed Nash equilibria [29]. The stag-hunt game is a two- 
player two-strategy game that captures the conflict between cooperation and safety 
involved in a situation where a hunter selects whether to hunt a stag or a hare without 
prior knowledge of another hunter’s choice. This game reaps the highest benefit to 
both players if both of them decide to hunt a stag and there is a higher risk to one 
player if the other player selects otherwise. This situation is similar to the privacy 
in social networks between two players because the highest benefit is accrued if both 
players cooperate and reveal all their attributes. The highest risk occurs to a user 
when the other user reveals less attributes because this leaves the more revealed 
user vulnerable to identity inference. However, the profile attribute privacy problem 
is different from the stag-hunt game because the privacy problem involves multiple 
players, and multiple strategies (options) in their privacy.
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Other works have also employed game theoretic models to capture the relation 
and coordination between different user properties in different networks in a variety 
of applications. The networks range from online video sharing social networks [30] 
to mobile ad-hoc networks [31], and anonymous social networks [32]. The modeled 
applications include sharing co-owned pictures in a social network [33] and stimulating 
cooperation in the network [30]. In most of these works [30, 34], a two party model is 
derived and used as a basis to create a model that captures the dynamics of the entire 
network. This is because the networks can be looked at as a collection of multiple two 
party interactions. We employ this same reasoning when designing models to capture 
the interaction of the user’s privacy in a social network. We do not model the privacy 
settings of any specific online social network, but rather focus on a possible model for 
a generic online social network.
CHAPTER 3
METHODS AND MODELS
3.1 Definitions and Strategies
3.1.1 Definitions
In our model, the vector Ax =  (aXil, aX)2, • ••, ax<m) denotes the profile attributes 
in the social network, where ax i is the ith attribute of User x. An example of an 
attribute vector for a generic user (Alice) is given by A Ance =  (Name, Gender, Age, 
Religion,..., Hometown). For simplicity, we assume all the users have the same set 
of profile attributes. In a generic case, we refer to a specific attribute by A ttr# i.
The value of the attributes is defined as a mapping Ax —> Vx, where Vx = 
(vx,ii vx,21 •••) vx,m) is a vector of the values of the attributes of User x. We use vx<l to 
denote the value of ith attribute of User x. For example, VAuce =  (Alice, Female, 27, 
Christian,..., Chicago).
For each User x, a vector Sx = (sxA,sXt2 , ■■■, sXtTn) denotes whether specific 
attributes are disclosed or revealed. If attribute ax is disclosed, then sx  ^ =  1 ; 
otherwise, sXj  =  0. For example, SAuce =  (1,1,0,0,..., 1) means that Alice decides to 
reveal her name, gender, and hometown, but withholds her age and religion.
We capture the similarities between two users using pairs. Two users Alice and 
Bob are said to have a pair if they both reveal the same attribute, e.g. age. Moreover,
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if both users have the same value for that mutually revealed attribute (e.g. the age 
for both of them is 27), then the users are said to have an equal value pair. Formally, 
a 2-tuple (aXti,aV'i) is called a pair if and only if sXii = 1 and sy>i — 1 . Additionally, 
if vX'i = Vy7i, then the 2 -tuple (aX)i, aVti) is referred to as an equal value pair. We 
use random variable Np to represent the number of pairs that two users share and 
random variable Nep as the number of equal value pairs of two users.
Figure 3.1 shows a possible profile configuration for two users x  and y. Out 
of the m  attributes, User x reveals kx attributes while User y reveals ky attributes. 
Both users reveal attributes A ttr# l, A ttr# 2 , ..., A ttr# r , which contribute to r pairs. 
The r pairs are denoted by (ax,i,aW)i), (ax,2 , ( ^ 2), ..., (ax>r,ayir).
A ttr# l 
Attr # r  
Attr # ( r  + 1 )
Attr#A;x 
Attr#(fcx -I-1)
Attr#(fcx + ky -  r)
Attr#(A;x + ky -  r + 1)
A ttr# ra
Figure 3.1: The figure shows a possible profile configuration for two users x and y, 
who disclose kx and ky attributes, respectively, from m  possible attributes. The clear 
rectangles represent the disclosed attributes while the shaded rectangles represent 
withheld the attributes.
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Figure 3.2 shows a similar profile configuration for the two users x and y with 
the attributes re-arranged such that the first r attributes are the r  pairs. We consider 
that 77 of the r pairs are equal value pairs. We assume that the 17 equal value pairs 
are important in establishing common ground for building friendships [25].
User x  User y
1 T) e q u a l v a lu e  p a ir s
A ttr# l
A ttr#2
Attr #77
A ttr#  (77 +  1 ) K + i
Attr # r
Attr # ( r  +  1 )
A ttr# 7B
> ( r  -  77) u n e q u a l v a lu e  p a ir s
u n p a ir e d  a t t r ib u te s
Figure 3.2: The figure illustrates the concept of equal value pairs given a profile 
configuration between two users x  and y who share r  pairs. An equal value pair 
is the occurrence of an identical valued attribute between two users. If the value 
of an attribute Aitrj^i is represented by ty, then the figure shows that attributes 
Attr#l...Attr#r) have identical values for both users (tq.-.iV/) and therefore make up 
77 equal value pairs. The attributes Attr#{rj-\-\)...Attr#r compose the pairs that are 
not equal value pairs since they do not have identical values in both users.
To capture the risk of identity inference, we introduce the concept of hiding. 
A user John is hidden by another user Jane if Jane is more distinguishable than John. 
For example, if VJohnDoe — {Doe, *, 34, *,..., *) and VJaneDoe = {Doe, Female, 34, *,..., 
Chicago), where V  refers to withheld attributes, then Jane is more distinguishable 
than John and therefore John is hidden by Jane. This is because it takes less effort 
for a third party to infer the identity of Jane than John given the revealed profile
17
attributes. Formally, given User x  discloses kx attributes and User y discloses ky, 
where kx < ky, User x  is hidden by User y if all the kx attributes disclosed by User x  
have the same values in both User x and y (cf. Figure 3.3). The set Dx of attributes 
disclosed by User x  is given by Dx =  {aXij | sx<i =  l , l < i < m } .  User x  is hidden by 
User y if and only if Dx C Dy and vX}i = vy<i for all ax<i 6  Dx.
User x  User y
A ttr# l  | vi | | V! |'
A ttr# 2  | v2 | | v2 | > kx e q u a l v a lu e  p a ir s
Attr#fcx j Vkx | | Vkx |
Attr#(fcx + 1) | j j l |  |vfcx+i|
U se r y d isc lo ses
Attr#*# ■  I »*, I
’ (ky -  kx) m o re  a t t r i b u te s
Attr#(fcy + 1) pHHj n e ith e r  U se r x n o r  U se r y
: : : i d isc lo ses t h e  re m a in in g
A ttr#m (m  — k y ) a t t r i b u te s
Figure 3.3: The risk to a user’s identity is dependent on whether that user can be 
easily distinguished from the rest of a network. User x is hidden if another user in 
the network exhibits characteristics identical to User x. Given users x  and y disclose 
kx and ky attributes, respectively, User x can be “hidden” by User y if kx < ky and 
the values exhibited by the kx attributes are identical to the same attributes in User 
y's profile. The figure shows such a scenario in which attributes Attr#1...A ttr# kx 
exhibit values v\...Vkx that are identical to the first kx attributes revealed by User y. 
In this case, User x  is hidden by User y.
Therefore, User x can be hidden by two types of users (cf. Figure 3.4). One 
type of users consists of the users who disclose the same set of attributes, where 
corresponding attributes have identical values (kx = ky = y). The other type of users 
consists of those users who reveal extra attributes in addition to the kx equal value 
pairs (kx = r) < kv).
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User x Users who disclose Users who disclose 
same set of attributes more attributes
A ttr# l M
Attr#2 M
A ttr# A;
M
Attr #(/c + 1 ) ■
Attr#(fc +  2) m
Attr#m »
V2
Vk
V2
Vk
V2
Vk
V2
Vk
vk+i i - F n r
Figure 3.4: The figure shows the two categories of users who can “hide” User x. 
The first category discloses the same number of attributes as User x , where all the 
revealed attributes are identical in value. The second category of users discloses more 
attributes in addition to the attributes disclosed by User x. The value of attribute 
A ttr# i  is denoted by c,. Disclosed attributes are represented by clear squares, while 
the withheld attributes are represented by shaded squares.
We define a social network as an undirected graph G =  (N, E) with node set 
N  and edge set E, where the node set N  = {1,2,..., n} corresponds to n users in the 
network.
Additionally, we consider that the connectivity pattern of the network can 
follow the different network types described in the previous section. These networks 
include random, small-world, scale-free, and Facebook friend networks.
3.1.2 Strategies
The privacy settings of a typical social network consist of levels of visibility 
of different aspects such as profile attributes, activity logs, and friend lists to various
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types of users, e.g. friends, friends of friends, and public. In our model, we consider 
a single level of visibility, i.e. whether profile attributes are visible to any other user 
of the network.
In the two-user and basic evolutionary game, a user’s strategy involves select­
ing how many attributes to reveal. Revealing more attributes increases the chance 
of having common attributes with other users which allows for friendship, while at 
the same time increases the risk of identity inference. Given m attributes, each user 
has m + 1 possible strategies which correspond to the number of attributes the user 
reveals (0, 1, ..., m). In the two-user game, we build an (m + 1) x (m + 1) payoff 
matrix made up of the payoff values for every possible strategy combination. The 
payoff values are evaluated from the positive and negative values associated with that 
strategy. In the basic evolutionary game, we classify the whole population into m + 1 
groups depending on which strategy they adopt. Each group consists of users who 
have selected to reveal a given number of attributes.
In the weighted evolutionary game, the strategy involves selecting which and 
how many attributes to disclose.
3.1.3 Network Topologies
In this dissertation, the weighted evolutionary game considers three different 
types of network topologies, which include a random network, a small-world network, 
and a scale-free network.
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A random network is a graph in which the occurrence of connection between 
nodes follows a probability distribution [37]. A random graph can be used for model­
ing social networks when the node degrees follow an arbitrary probability distribution. 
The Erdos-Renyi (ER) [39] model is considered to generate the random networks. The 
probabilities that edges occurs between any two nodes are equal and independent. 
Given the probability of an edge occurrence is p and there are n nodes, the average 
node degree k is approximately equal to n • p.
In a small-world network, most of the nodes are not directly connected to 
each other, but most nodes can be reached by every other node within a relatively 
small number of hops. Online social networks have been shown to exhibit small-world 
properties and can be produced using a Watts-Strogatz model in two steps [40]. In 
the first step, a regular ring lattice of n nodes is created and each node is connected 
with |  on each side making the average node degree k. In the second step, the edges 
are rewired with probability f3 to create the “shortcuts” that transform the regular 
network to a small-world network [40].
A scale-free network is a network where the node degree distribution follows a 
power-law distribution, i.e. the number of nodes decreases exponentially as the node 
degree increases. The scale-free network is created using the preferential attachment 
mechanism, which means a node with a higher degree is more likely to attract new 
connections compared to a node with a lower degree [41].
3.2 Models
We propose three game-theoretic models. One model is a two-user game, 
which captures interactions between two users while setting up their privacy. This 
is extended to a basic evolutionary game to capture the dynamics of the privacy 
preference of multiple users in a large-scale social network. This model is then 
extended to a weighted evolutionary game to investigate the influence of attribute 
weight and network topology on the privacy of users in a social network.
There are many online social networks available today with a variety of privacy 
designs [9, 10]. Therefore, we model a generic social network with characteristics 
exhibited by some of the social networks. For example, in our models, every user 
has a profile made up of profile attributes, where each user is tasked with selecting 
how many and which attributes to reveal to other users. In the two-user and basic 
evolutionary games, the revelation is to all other users in the network, whereas in 
the weighted evolutionary game, the revelation is only to the user’s friends. However, 
our models do not consider categories of friends with different levels of privacy which 
is a characteristic of some social networks. The assumptions used to construct the 
models and their justifications are provided in Table 3.1.
3.2.1 The Two-user Attribute Disclosure Game
In this model, we consider a two-user game between User x and User y to 
understand the basic interaction in complex networks such as online social networks. 
We use a utility function to capture the incentives of players [36].
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Table 3.1: Assumptions and Justifications for the Models
Assumptions Justifications
We define risk as the potential for identify inference. Identity inference is an important path for privacy infor­
mation leakage. Defining risk as the potential for identify 
inference allows us to build the relationship between 
profile attribute disclosure and privacy risk, even though 
there are other types of privacy risk Issues.
We define the positive utility from information revelation 
as the number of friendships made in the two-user game 
and the basic evolutionary game.
With an increase in the number of friendships, the users 
can benefit more from communication with others, and 
sharing more information with others.
We assume equal importance for each profile attribute in 
the two-user and basic evolutionary games.
Many social network user profiles consist of similar 
attributes [11, 12]. In such a profile, one attribute is 
not necessarily more risky or important than another 
attribute. However, we also consider dissimilar- attributes 
in the weighted evolutionary game model.
Users with more common attributes are more likely to be 
friends.
This assumption Is based on research which shows that 
the homophily principle is exhibited in social networks 
[22, 23],
In the two-user and basic evolutionary games, we assume 
the probability of two users with ?/ equal value pairs being 
friends is given by Equation 3.3.
Lampe et al. [24] find that the number of friends that a 
user has is exponentially related to the size of the set of 
attributes that user reveals.
In the two-user and basic evolutionary' games, each 
attribute has the same number of possible values. In 
the weighted evolutionary game, all users in the network 
attach the same importance to any given attribute, e.g. 
all users will consider their address attribute to be more 
important than their religion attribute.
These assumptions allow us to investigate the influence of 
global network properties while simultaneously compar­
ing local properties such as profile attributes and their 
importance to users on a common ground.
Positive Utility
The positive utility of revealing more attributes is the increased chance of 
establishing common ground with other users and thereby potentially obtaining more
23
new friends. Given users x  and y disclosing kx and ky attributes, respectively, the 
probability of having exactly r  pairs is given by
(D  • (‘") • (? '* ;)
E  ( r )  ■ iki)  ■* l— \Kx' \ l / \ fCy—i /
i=max{fci+fej,—m,0}
where m is the total number of attributes. We use random variables Np and Nep to 
denote the number of pairs and the number of equal value pairs, respectively. The 
proof for Equation 3.1 is provided in Section 4 (Theorem 4.1).
Given r pairs, we can calculate the probability of getting r] equal value pairs,
using
P(N,p = n \ N r = r) = iL l J Z Z  . Q  (3 .2 )
where L is the number of values that an attribute can have. The proof for Equation
3.2 is provided in Section 4 (Theorem 4.2).
Given the number of friends that a user has is exponentially related to the set
of attributes [24], we assume the probability of two users with r\ equal value pairs
being friends is given by
pOtf)
P{F  | Nep = t)) = — -----  (3.3)
v 1 p ’ e a m  +  e v ’
where e > 0 and a indicates motivation. Dividing eQT? by eam + e guarantees that 
P(F  | Nep = rj) is between 0 and 1.
Additionally, we select an exponential style function because it mitigates the 
adverse effect brought by users with a lower number of equal value pairs. Users 
with a small set of equal value pairs are numerous but have little impact in building 
friendships.
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The motivation a captures the increase in the likelihood of being friends 
with an increase in equal value pairs. We consider three different values for a. 
Figure 3.5 shows the likelihood of being friends evaluated from Equation 3.3 for 
a  € {0.2,0.9,1.5}. Lower values of a  have slower change but higher initial values.
a=0.2
a=0.9
a=1.5
0.8
0.7
—  0.6
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Figure 3.5: The figure shows the probability of being friends from Equation 3.3 
for different values of motivation a and equal value pairs 77. Increasing the number 
of equal value pairs boosts the probability of being friends for all a  values. This 
observation mimics the homophily principle more commonly known as “birds of a 
feather flock together,” since increased equal value pairs indicates similarity between 
users.
Given users x and y disclose kx and ky attributes, respectively, the probability 
Pkx,kv(F) °f them being friends is therefore given by combining two probabilities: (1 ) 
the probability of them being friends if they have 77 equal value pairs and (2 ) the 
probability of them having the 77 equal value pairs in the first place. Pkx,ky(F ) is
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evaluated using
min{fcx,fcj,}
J W F )  =  Y  =  r)
r=max{kx+ky—m,0} 
r
■ Y  P (F  I N'P = n) ■ P ( K ,  =  V I Np =  r), (3.4)
T)=0
where Pkx,ky(Np = r ) is the probability of having exactly r  pairs, P (F  | Nep =  7/) is 
the probability of being friends given 7/ equal value pairs, and P(Nep = r/ | iVp =  r) is 
the probability of having 77 equal value pairs given r  pairs.
Negative Utility
The negative utility of revealing more attributes is the increased risk incurred 
by the user. In our models, risk is equivalent to the chance of a user’s identity being 
inferred from their disclosed attributes. A user’s identity can be compared to a set 
of attributes that uniquely differentiate a user from a large group of users. Therefore, 
risk is inversely proportional to the number of users among whom a user can be hidden. 
This is because the higher the number of users with identical disclosed attributes, the 
less the probability of inferring a specific user’s identity or preference. The users with 
unique sets of disclosed attributes have the highest risk in the population.
In the two-user game, User x discloses kx attributes and User y discloses ky 
attributes. If kx > ky, then there is no chance that User x is hidden by User y. The 
reason is that User x will always be more distinguishable than y regardless of which 
ky attributes are selected by User y. If kx = ky and all kx disclosed attributes are 
equal value pairs, then User x is hidden by User y and they reduce each other’s risk. 
This is because User x  cannot be distinguished from y if all the attributes they reveal 
are identical. However, if kx < ky, and all kx attributes disclosed by User x are all
equal value pairs, then User x  is hidden by User y, and the risk of User x  is reduced. 
Hence, we get the formula for negative utility as follows:
Section 4 (Theorem 4.3).
Combining Positive Utility and Negative Utility
When users x and y exist in the same social network, they have a probability 
of becoming friends with Pkx,ky(F) and are also under the risk of identity inference 
Rkx,ky- We use the ratio of Pkx,ky(F) to Rkx,ky to obtain an appropriate utility function
In Equation 3.6, User x discloses kx attributes, while User y discloses ky 
attributes.
3.2.2 Basic Evolutionary Game
A basic evolutionary game is employed to analyze the dynamics of privacy 
among multiple users in online social networks. Given m  attributes, we divide the 
population into m  +  1 groups which consist of users who disclose the same number of 
attributes. Figure 3.6 shows an arbitrarily selected User Sk who discloses k attributes 
and belongs to group k of nk users.
(3.5)
1
where m  is the total number of attributes. The proof for Equation 3.5 is provided in
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U ser Uk w h o  d isc lo ses k  a t t r ib u te s
Figure 3.6: In the basic evolutionary game, the population is divided into m  + 1 
groups, which correspond to how many attributes are revealed. Given that every user 
has m  attributes, their strategy options include revealing 1 , 2 , m  attributes or 
withholding all attributes (revealing 0  attributes), hence a total of m +  1 strategies. 
We calculate the positive and negative utilities of an arbitrarily selected User 8k by 
comparing them with different groups of users.
Replicator Equation
Replicator dynamics are used to provide the population dynamics for each 
proportion [42]:
Ok =  0k[fk -  <p] (3.7)
where Ok is the proportion of all users who disclose k attributes. The parameter Ok 
is the differentiation of Ok over time, where the time unit is the iteration step in the 
process of solving Equation 3.7. The value of Ok is given by where nk is the number 
of users disclosing k attributes and n is the total number of users. The fitness of type 
k is denoted by fk which is defined later on in Equation 3.11, and 4> is the average 
population fitness which is given by Equation 3.8.
Users who disclose k attributes are referred to as type k. The fitness of the 
basic evolutionary game is comparable to the utility function of the two-user game, 
and is also comprised of positive utility and negative utility. Positive utility is the
expected number of friends that a user can make by disclosing k attributes while 
negative utility is the risk of inference from disclosing k attributes. Similar to the 
two-user game, the risk factor for a certain user is inversely proportional to the number 
of users that can hide that user.
The average population fitness <f> is given by:
m
0 =  (3.8)
fc=o
Positive Utility
The positive utility is an extension of the two-user game’s positive utility in 
Equation 3.4. In a large social network, the expected number of friends Np that User 
5k can make is:
m
Et[NF] = Y ^ nf ptJAF )
fc'= 0
m min{fc,fc'}
= S  nk' pk,k'{Np = r)
k ' —O r = m a x { k + k f—m,0}
r
■Y, P( F\ N<,r = V)-P(Ncp = ,t \Nr = r) (3.9)
7J=0
where nk> is the number of users of type k'. Equation 3.9 is derived by summing 
Equation 3.4 for all possible k' values and respective .
Negative Utility
In the evolutionary game, the negative utility is calculated using
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The term -py • • {nk — 1) is the number of users of type k who can hide User
m—k
<5/b. The term V^rr • pr • f^c+i is the number of users who can hide User 6k, and 
t = l  U + i J
are from the groups that disclose strictly more attributes.
Combining Positive Utility and Negative Utility
Similar to Equation 3.6, we use the ratio of positive utility to negative utility 
to define the fitness of type k using
A = (3-11)
n-k
All the users of the same type have the same fitness value.
3.2.3 The Weighted Evolutionary Game
We extend the previous model by considering a weighted evolutionary game. 
This model considers that users attach different importances to different attributes. 
This is captured by assigning weights to each attribute. Additionally, the topology 
of the network is considered. In this model, the positive utility of a user is affected 
by the number and type of attributes that a user shares with the neighbors.
We consider that the benefits and risks are affected by the users at two different 
levels of social closeness. The first level only includes User x ’s friends, and the second 
level also includes User x ’s friends-of-friends. We adopt influential range (I R ) to 
represent which level of users contribute to User x ’s benefit and/or risk.
BX{IR) = <
{F}, IR  = 1 ,
(3.12)
{F} U {FoF}, IR  =  2,
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where IR  denotes influential range, F  represents friend, and FoF stands for friend-of- 
friend. Therefore, Bx( 1) is the set of all the friends. Bx(2) includes not just friends, 
but also friends-of-friends.
In our game, the utility is a combination of benefits (positive utility) and 
risks (negative utility). A user’s positive utility is related to the amount and type of 
attributes that the user shares with other users in their influential range. The set of 
users who contribute to User x’s positive utility is denoted by BX(IR).
Conversely, the risk is the probability of a user’s identity being inferred. This 
probability is measured by the reciprocal of the number of the users who disclose the 
same or additional attributes, i.e. how many users in the influential range can hide 
that user. The set B^(IR) consists of users in the influential range who disclose the 
same attributes as x or extra attributes in addition to those disclosed by User x, and 
can possibly hide User x. The set B^(IR) determines how much risk a user is exposed 
to.
The combined utility (payoff) function is obtained by using
where wP and wN are the weight coefficients for the positive utility ^2yeBx{m) (S* A &v) 
x W T and negative utility rg^r, respectively1.
y€ BX(IR)
(3.13)
We define the benefit-to-risk ratio (B R R ) as wP : wN, which is the ratio of
the coefficient for positive utility to the coefficient for negative utility.
1 U n less  o th e rw ise  s t a te d ,  w e u se  n o ta t io n  A to  re p re s e n t log ic  A N D . N o ta t io n  W T  re fe rs  to  th e  
t r a n s p o s e  o f  v e c to r  W .
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Our model is iterative and synchronous. First, each user in the network is 
assigned a random initial attribute sign flag vector. In every iteration, each user 
compiles a set of candidate neighbors whose privacy settings they may mimic. This 
set consists of the neighbors who derive a higher utility from their privacy settings 
than the user derives from his/her own settings. Based on the neighbors’ utilities, each 
user decides whether to change or maintain their strategy. A user is likely to change 
his/her strategy if his/her neighbors derive a higher utility from their own strategies 
than the user derives from his/her own. If a user decides to change his/her strategy, 
one of the candidate neighbors is then selected as the object to mimic. The mimicking 
process involves a user changing one digit of his sign flag to the corresponding digit 
of the candidate neighbor’s sign flag. This is analogous to a user Alice deciding to 
reveal her location attribute after seeing that her friend Bob, who has a higher utility, 
has a revealed location attribute. At the end of each iteration, all the users update 
their strategies synchronously. The procedure keeps running iteratively until there 
are no users who change their sign flags between two consecutive iterations. When 
this condition has been met, the model is said to achieve convergence.
Formally, users follow the replicator rule to update their strategies between 
two successive time steps [43]. Each node makes a decision to maintain or change its 
current strategy based on the utilities exhibited by its neighbors. Given ulx and uy 
are the utilities of User x  and User y respectively at time t, the probability of User x 
(at time t + 1) adopting the strategy of User y (at time t) is given by:
We use the largest difference dm^ in payoff between any two users in the network to 
guarantee that PJ+ 1 € [0,1]. Equation 3.14 implies that the probability of User x 
following the strategy of a neighbor (User y) is proportional to the payoff difference 
between users x and y, when User y ’s utility is higher than User x ’s. This probability 
value is evaluated for all members of the candidate neighbor set Cx.
Each user’s decision to maintain or change his/her strategy depends on PJ+ 1 
values for the entire candidate neighbor set Cx. The probability of User x  maintaining 
its original strategy, as derived from [43], is given by:
w t =  r u i _  o  (3-i5)
y e c x
Conversely, the probability of User x  changing its strategy between t and t +  1 is 
given by
o r 1 =  i -  n  -  - O -  (3.i6)
y e c x
After evaluating all probabilities and deciding to change his/her strategy, each
user selects the neighbor to mimic in the update process. A higher PJ+ 1 value for
candidate y translates to a higher probability of being selected as the mimic object
y*. The implementation of selecting y* is based on a mathematical model called balls
into non-uniform bins [18], in which the probability2 P(yt) of a ball falling into a
certain bin is proportional to the size of the bin. In Figure 3.7, the size of the each
2In  th i s  d is s e r ta tio n , w e u se  y  to  re fe r to  a  g e n e ra l u se r , a n d  w e u se  y t to  re fe r  to  a  specific  u se r .
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bin is exactly equal to p*V/&, where A — Ylyecx ^x+y- I*1 total, there are \CX\ bins. 
Therefore, the probability of the ball falling into ith bin is given by:
P(Ui) = *& /*  (3-17)
rand G [0, .......................
Figure 3.7: The figure shows the implementation of selecting one of the neighbors
as y* based on the model of balls into non-uniform bins, where Cx =  yi, y2, y \ c x\-
The probability of selecting neighbor yi is directly proportional to Px+y]-
>
After the mimic object is determined, the specific attribute to mimic is ran­
domly selected from the attributes with different sign values.
The algorithm for updating the attribute sign flag is shown in Algorithm 1 .
3.2.4 Working Case for Risk-free Scenario
In this subsection, we describe a working case of a risk-free scenario of our 
model, in which the influential range is restricted to a user’s friends (neighbors). 
Figure 3.8a shows the topology structure of the network in this example, which 
consists of 8  users, whose profile attributes and associated weights axe shown in Figure 
3.8b. The profile attributes include (Name, Gender, Age,..., Hometown) with weight 
vector {wi,W2 ,W3 , ..., w-f) =  (0.02,0.06,0.10,0.14,0.18,0.22,0.28). Figure 3.8c shows 
the initial sign flags for all 8  users. For example, User 5 has a sign flag S$ =  (1100110), 
which means that only his/her name, gender, education, and occupation are revealed.
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In the next few paragraphs, we show how User 5 may change his/her strategy in our 
model.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for updating profile attribute sign flag 
Input: Initial sign flag iS F  
Output: Final sign flag f S F
1 Assign iS F  for each node;
2 do
3 for each node do
4 Find the set of candidate neighbors Cx;
5 Evaluate Pit,1 for all members of candidate set;
Evaluate probability of changing strategy Qj.+1;
Generate a random number rand £ [0,1]; 
if rand< Qx+1 then
/* Decision is made to change strategy */
10 Select neighbor y* from Cx;
n  /* Neighbor is selected using balls into non-uniform bins */
12 Change single bit from SFX to mimic SFy-;
end13
14
15
end
All nodes update sign flags synchronously; 
la while any node changes sign flag; 
lr return f S F
In the first step, every user calculates their utilities from Equation 3.13. This 
involves a comparison of the users’ revealed attributes with each neighbor. User 5 
has two neighbors: User 1 and User 2 with initial sign flags Si = (1000110) and 
S2 = (0110011), respectively. The attribute pairs between any two users are obtained 
by using bit-wise AND operation between the users’ sign flag vectors. The bit-wise 
AND operation between Si and 5s is (1000110), which means that both User 1 and 
User 5 disclosed attributes 1, 5, and 6. The summation of the weights of attribute 
pairs (Equation 3.13) is therefore given by w l  +  wh + ic6, which evaluates to 0.42. 
Similarly, the summation of the weights of attribute pairs between S 2 and S5 is 0.28.
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The positive utility for any user is obtained by summing the weighted pair sums for 
all his/her neighbors. In this case, the positive utility for User 5 is the sum of the 
weighted attribute pairs between User 5 and both User 1 and User 2. This evaluates 
to 0.42 +  0.28 =  0.70. In a similar fashion, the utilities are evaluated for all the 
network users. Table 3.2 shows the positive utilities for Users 5, 1, and 2 .
Table 3.2: The Process of Calculating Payoff Value and Choosing Mimic Object 
from the Candidate Neighbors.
U s e r N e ig h b o r A N D  r e s u l t W e ig h te d  r e s u l t P o s i t i v e  u t i l i t y Dt+1
U ser 5
U ser 1 1000110 w \ +  w5 +  wt$ =  0.42
0.70 N /A
U ser 2 0100010 w'2 +  10$ =  0.28
U ser 2 0000010 w s =  0.22
U ser 3 1000100 Wi +  w 5 =  0.2
U ser 1 U ser 4 0000000 0 1.26 0.41
U ser 5 1000110 w i +  w 5 +  w 0 =  0.42
U ser 8 1000110 w i +  w s +  u>s — 0.42
U ser 1 0000010 W(j =  0.22
U ser 5 0100010 tt>2 +  W 6 =  0.28
U ser 2 U ser 6 0100011 W2 +  Wq + Wt =  0.56 1.38 0.49
U ser 7 0010000 Wi — 0.10
U ser 8 0000010 tt'ti =  0.22
In the second step, each user evaluates the probability of mimicking 
his/her neighbors according to Equation 3.14. The maximum range between the 
utility values for the network nodes dmax is found to be 1.38. User 5 only has to
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consider User 1 and User 2 when evaluating these probability values. evaluates 
to 0.41 while P^2 evaluates to 0.49.
In the third step, each user decides whether to change or maintain his/her 
strategy by using Equation 3.16 which utilizes the probabilities evaluated in the step 
above. For User 5, Q\ evaluates to 0.6991. If a randomly selected number in the range 
[0,1] is less than Q\, then User 5 decides to change his/her strategy. Otherwise, User 
5 maintains his/her strategy. In our case, User 5 decides to change his/her strategy.
In the fourth step, users who decided to change their strategies select a can­
didate neighbor to mimic. Candidate neighbors should exhibit higher utility values 
than the user itself. The probability of User x selecting a specific neighbor y is directly 
proportional to P^ Py f°r that neighbor. Since Users 1 and 2 both have higher utilities 
than User 5, they are both viable candidates for User 5 to mimic. After normalizing 
P5j  and Pg2, the bin sizes for User 1 and User 2  are 0.46 and 0.54, respectively (cf. 
Equation 3.17 and Figure 3.7). In our case, User 5 selects User 2 as the mimic object.
In the fifth step, each user who decided to change their strategy selects which 
attribute to reveal or withhold to resemble their mimic object. Comparing User 5’s 
and User 2’s sign flags reveals that they differ in four positions, i.e. 1, 3, 5, and 7. 
User 5 can mimic User 2 in one of the following ways: revealing attribute 3, revealing 
attribute 7, withholding attribute 1, or withholding attribute 5. In our case, User 5 
decides to reveal attribute 7.
All five steps are repeated in each iteration until no single user changes his/her 
strategy between two successive iterations. The system is then said to have converged.
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Figure 3.8d shows the sign flags for all eight users after a single iteration. 
Figure 3.8e shows the sign flags for the whole network after convergence. In this 
simulation, convergence is achieved after 11 iterations.
(a)
W \ W2 W-i U>4 w 5 w r
(0.02) (0.06) (0.10) (0.14) (0.18) (0.22) (0.28)
Name Gender Age Religion Education Occupation Hometown
(b)
Node W'l W2 W>3 U’4 U'5 l<’6 U>7
User 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
User 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
User 3 i 1 0 0 l 0 0
User 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
User 5 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
User 6 0 1 0 1 0 1 l
User 7 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
User 8 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
(c)
N o d e m W2 W3 W i U’5 w 6 U»7
User 1 l 0 0 0 1 1 0
User 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
User 3 l 0 0 0 1 0 0
User 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
User 5 l 1 0 0 1 1 1
User 6 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
User 7 l 1 1 0 1 0 0
User 8 l 0 0 1 0 1 0
( d )
N o d e Wi U>2 w 3 W i w 3 Wfj U>7
User 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
User 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
User 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
User 4 0 0 1 0 1
User 5 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
User 6 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
User 7 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
User 8 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
(e)
Figure 3.8: (a) A sample network consisting of eight users, (b) each user has a 
profile with seven attributes with a weight vector, (c) initial sign flags for all eight 
users, (d) every user updates their strategy, and (e) the illustrated system converges.
CHAPTER 4
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide proofs for the theorems introduced and utilized in 
this dissertation.
T heorem  4.1. Given that User x discloses kx attributes and User y discloses ky 
attributes, the probability of having exactly r pairs is given by
fm—kx\
, w w- - o  =  ■t.ft.X i  ■E (m\  (kx\ (m—kx\\ k x J V  i  )  ‘  V  k y ~ i  )
i = m a x { k x + k y —m,0}
Proof. User x has (™) ways of selecting kx attributes for disclosure from all m  
attributes in his/her profile. Similarly, there are (**) ways of obtaining r pairs from 
the kx disclosed attributes. Figure 3.1 shows a profile configuration arrangement in 
which users x and y have r  pairs. As shown in the figure, to have exactly r pairs, 
the kx — r unpaired but revealed attributes of User x should not correspond with the 
ky — r unpaired but revealed attributes from User y. In fact, the ky — r unpaired 
but revealed attributes from User y can only correspond to the m — kx unrevealed 
attributes from User x.
Therefore, as shown in Equation 4.1, the number Ar of ways to obtain r pairs 
is a product of selecting kx from m  attributes, selecting r out of the kx attributes,
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and selecting ky — r attributes from m — kx withheld attributes,
( m \  ( kx\  ( m  — kx\
J ' ( r ) - U - r )
(4.1)
The number of pairs between two users Np varies between two extremes. The 
highest possible number of pairs is achieved when there is maximum overlap between 
the attributes disclosed by both users. In this case, the number of pairs is equal to the 
smaller number of revealed attributes and is given by Np =  min{A:x, ky}. On the other 
hand, the lowest possible number of pairs is achieved when there is minimum overlap 
between the revealed attributes of both users. This number is equal to 0  if both sets 
of revealed attributes are completely disjointed, but equal to kx + ky — m  if the sum 
of the revealed attributes is higher than the number of profile attributes for any user. 
The maximum number of pairs is therefore given by Np = m&x{kx + ky — m, 0}. For 
example, if Alice reveals five out of seven attributes, and Bob reveals four out of the 
seven attributes, then the maximum number of pairs is four and the minimum number 
of pairs is two. However, if Alice reveals two of the seven attributes and Bob reveals 
four of the seven attributes, then the maximum and minimum number of pairs is two 
and zero, respectively.
Therefore, the number of pairs Np is an integer in the range between max-fA;* + 
ky — m, 0} and min{kx,ky}. The probability of having exactly r pairs is therefore 
obtained by dividing Ar by A* where i takes on all possible values of Np. □
T heorem  4.2. Given r pairs, the probability of getting rj equal value pairs is
40
Proof. We assume that each attribute can take one of the L possible values. Ad­
ditionally, there exist r  pairs between the two users x  and y. To obtain 77 equal 
value pairs, 77 of the r pairs belonging to User x should match with User y, while 
the r  — 77 remaining paired attributes must exhibit one of the remaining L — 1 values 
not already exhibited by User y. Without any restrictions, there are a total of L2r 
possible assignments for the r pairs. Given that 77 of the pairs have identical values, 
the numbers of possible assignments is given by Lr ■ l v ■ (L — l)r~n. The probability 
of having 77 equal value pairs is a product of Q  ways of selecting 77 equal value pairs 
from r pairs, and the ratio L □
Theorem  4.3. Given that User x and User y disclose kx and ky attributes, respec­
tively, the defined negative utility function of User x in the two-user game is obtained
Proof. The negative utility is given by the risk of identity inference. A user’s identity 
is less likely to be inferred if that user is hidden by another user. In our model, the
characteristics (attributes and their values) exhibited by User x. For example, if Alice 
exhibits completely unique characteristics in a network, then her risk is 1. If, on the 
other hand, another user in the network exhibits the same characteristics as Alice 
(same name, age, hometown, etc.), then Alice’s risk is | .
by:
1 if kx > ky.
risk of User x is equated to the inverse of the number of users that exhibit the same
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Formally, given two users x and y disclose kx and ky attributes, respectively, 
User x cannot be hidden by User y if kx > ky, because User x is more distinguishable 
than y since User x  reveals more attributes that uniquely identify them compared to 
User y. In this case, the risk for User x takes the maximum value of 1 because the 
only user with x ’s characteristics is User x  himself.
When kx < ky, there is a probability that User x is hidden by User y. User x is 
hidden by User y when all the attributes disclosed by User x are identical to attributes 
disclosed by User y. Given m attributes, there are a total of (™)(™) ways for users 
x and y to select kx and ky attributes for revelation, respectively. For x  to be hidden 
by y, the kx revealed attributes should be equal value pairs and any extra attributes 
(ky — kx) revealed by User y should correspond to the m — kx attributes that User 
x  withheld. This can happen in ((”) ) ways. Therefore, the probability that
User x reveals attributes only among the attributes revealed by y is given by
UJ
Assuming that any attribute can take up one of L possible values, the probability of
( m —kx \
x  being hidden by y becomes —^ y - p b -  The number of users with x’s characteristics
/ m - k x \
is therefore 1 +  p b  and therefore User x’s risk is given by l/(\+--f ^ kv '  p^). □
Vfcy/ v^ y/
We consider the risk-free scenario by nullifying the influence of the risk factor 
(negative utility) on the utility function in Equation 3.6 and fitness equation in 
Equation 3.11. This is done by setting Rkx,ky = 1 so that the risk is unaffected 
by the number of revealed attributes of any users. In this way, the strategies of the 
users only vary with the positive utility and are therefore risk-free (or negative utility 
free).
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Sim ulations Settings
We conduct simulations of the risk-included and risk-free cases for the two-user 
game, basic evolutionary game, and the weighted evolutionary game. In all games, we 
consider user profiles made up of seven attributes (m = 7), which each user can reveal 
or withhold. This is sufficiently large to make observations that can be applied to a 
generic online social network. We set the number of users in the basic evolutionary 
game to 80 so that all eight categories of users initially have a round number of 
members. We set the number of users in the weighted evolutionary game model to 
1 0 0  to emphasize the differences in graph structure between the considered network 
topologies. Other simulation settings specific to particular games are provided below 
and in Table 5.1.
5.1.1 Two-user Gam e
In the two-user game, the motivation is set to a G {0.2}. For the risk-free 
cases, the risk Rij  is made independent of i and j  by setting it to 1 .
We use the payoff matrix to derive the Nash equilibria for the two-user game. 
The payoff matrix shows the payoff values for each strategy combination for both 
players. Each payoff value is calculated from Equation 3.6 and the resultant payoff
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Table 5.1: Parameter Values Used in the Models
Parameter
Value
Two-user game Basic evolutionary game Weighted evolutionary game
a 0.2 0.2.0.9.1.5 -
\N\ 2 80 100
\ A \ 7 7 7
W p - - 1
U’N - - 15
W - - (0.02,0.06.0.10.0.14.0.18.0.22.0.28)
matrices for the risk-included and risk-free two-user games are provided in Table 5.2
and Table 5.3, respectively.
Table 5.2: Payoff Matrix of the Two-user Game for Risk-included Scenario
\  u
.v  \
*» =  o A:„ =  l A-„ =  2 A'„ =  3 k y  ~  4 k y  =  5 k y  =  6 k y  =  7
A'* =  0 0.1104. 0.1104 0.2209. 0.1104 0.2209. 0.1104 0.2209. 0.1104 0.2209. 0.1104 0.2209. 0.1104 0.2209. 0.1104 0.2209. 0.1104
k T =  1 0.1104. 0.2209 0.0327. 0.0327 0.0717. 0.0654 0.1122. 0.0982 0.1558. 0.1309 0.2025. 0.1636 0.2524. 0.1963 0.1581. 0.1186
frr =  2 0.1104. 0.2209 0.0654. 0.0717 0.0170. 0.0170 0.0517. 0.0509 0.10.50. 0.1018 0.1787. 0.1697 0.1896. 0.1757 0.1415. 0.1273
A-t =  3 0.1104. 0.2209 0.0982. 0.1122 0.0509, 0.0517 0.0141. 0.0141 0.0566, 0.0564 0.1105. 0.1093 0.1541. 0.1509 0.1418. 0.1367
A:r =  4 0.1104. 0.2209 0.1309, 0.1558 0.1018. 0.1050 0.0564. 0.0566 0.0151. 0.0151 0.0588. 0.0587 0.1222. 0.1215 0.1486. 0.1468
A =  5 0.1104. 0.2209 0.1636. 0.2025 0.1697. 0.1787 0.1093. 0.1105 0.0587. 0.0588 0.0210. 0.0210 0.0871. 0.0870 0.1583. 0.1577
Av =  6 0.1104. 0.2209 0.1963. 0.2524 0.1757. 0.1896 0.1509. 0.1541 0.1215. 0.1222 0.0870, 0.0871 0.0467. 0.0467 0.1695, 0.1693
A', =  7 0.1104. 0.2209 0.1186,0.1581 0.1273. 0.1415 0.1367. 0.1418 0.1468. 0.1486 0.1577. 0.1583 0.1693. 0.1695 0.1818. 0.1818
As an example, consider User x  discloses three attributes, while User y discloses 
six attributes (kx =  3, ky = 6 ). Given m = 7, a  =  0.2, e = 5.0, and L =  3, the payoff 
value of the risk-included two-user game is calculated.
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Table 5.3: Payoff Matrix of the Two-user Game for Risk-free Scenario
\ .  V 
x
t'„ =  (1 t-, =  1 If II Co t'„ — 4 k,  =  5 k„ = 6 t-„ =  7
tv = o 0.1104. 0.1104 0.1104. 0.1104 0.1104. 0.1104 0.1104.0.1104 0.1104. 0.1104 0.1104. 0.1104 0.1104. 0.1104 0.1104. 0.1104
tv =  1 0.1104. 0.1104 0.0327. 0.0327 0.0654. 0.0654 0.0982. 0.0982 0.1309. 0.1309 0.1636. 0.1636 0.1963. 0.1963 0.1186. 0.1186
tv =  2 0.1104. 0.1104 0.0604. 0.0654 0.0170. 0.0170 0.0509. 0.0509 0.1018. 0.1018 0.1697. 0.1697 0.1757, 0.1757 0.1273. 0.1273
tv = 3 0.1104. 0.1104 0.0982. 0.0982 0.0509. 0.0509 0.0141. 0.0141 0.0564. 0.0564 0.1093, 0.1093 0.1509. 0.1-509 0.1367, 0.1367
tv = 4 0.1104. 0.1104 0.1309. 0.1309 0.1018. 0.1018 0.0564. 0.0564 0.0151. 0.0151 0.0587. 0.0587 0.1215. 0.1215 0.1468. 0.1468
tv  =  5 0.1104. 0.1104 0.1636. 0.1636 0.1697. 0.1697 0.1093, 0.1093 0.0587. 0.0587 0.0210. 0.0210 0.0870. 0.0870 0.1577. 0.1577
tv = 6 0.1104. 0.1104 0.1963. 0.1963 0.1757. 0.1757 0.1509. 0.1509 0.1215. 0.1215 0.0870. 0.0870 0.0467. 0.0467 0.1693. 0.1693
tv = 7 0.1104. 0.1104 0.1186. 0.1186 0.1273. 0.1273 0.1307. 0.1367 0.1468.0.1468 0.1577. 0.1577 0.1693. 0.1693 0.1818. 0.1818
User x’s utility is calculated from Equation 3.6, ux = P:t^ P , where P3i6 (F) is 
calculated from Equation 3.4:
min{3,6}
P*>(F) = E  W  = r)
r —max{3+6—7,0} 
r
• 5 3  P (F  | iVep =  V) ■ P(Nep — r) \ Np = r) =  0.1509,
0
while R3i6 is calculated from Equation 3.5, P 3,6 =  jU =  0.9793. User
w
x’s utility is therefore given by «x =  2-l|2|  =  0.1541. Similarly, User y ’s utility is 
evaluated from uy =  P^ P , where the positive utility PejiF) = P3,e(F) =  0.1509.
Prom Equation 3.5, we find that User y's negative utility is 1. This risk is 
maximum because User y cannot be hidden by User x. Therefore, User y's utility in 
the same scenario is uy — 0.1509.
5.1.2 Basic E volutionary Gam e
For the basic evolutionary game, we set the motivation a € {0.2,0.9,1.5}. 
Similar to the two-user game in Section 5.1.1, the negative utility Pj,j in the risk-free 
case is made independent of i and j  by setting it to 1. The social network considered
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consists of 80 users with eight possible strategies. The users are categorized according 
to the strategy they employ. After initializing the population in each of the eight 
categories to ten users, we observe how the populations of the categories change over 
time.
5.1.3 Weighted Evolutionary Game
In this section, we describe the underlying simulation settings. The simulations 
deal with risk-included and risk-free cases of the weighted evolutionary game.
The simulation is designed to consider user profiles with seven attributes (m = 
7). Each user can choose to reveal or to withhold each of these attributes. A 7-bit. 
flag is assigned to each user, which corresponds to the attributes. For example, the 
flag 1000110 for User 1 means that Attributes 1, 5 and 6  are revealed while Attributes 
2, 3, 4, and 7 are withheld.
We begin by randomly assigning the attribute flag to all users of the network. 
During each iteration, each user has two options: maintain his/her attribute flag, or 
change it (by revealing or withholding a single attribute).
To consider different levels of the risk, we choose three different benefit-to-risk 
ratios (BRRs), which are 1 : 0, 1 : 15, and 1 : 30 (cf. Table 5.1). While all the 
attributes are assigned to different weights, the weight vector for the attributes is 
assumed to be the same for each user of the network. Additional simulation settings 
are shown in Table 5.1. We run the simulation for each configuration 500 times. 
After averaging 500 simulation results, we obtain the dynamic curves in each of the
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considered networks, which include random, small-world, scale-free, and Facebook 
friend networks.
The size and average node degree for each network are all listed in Table 5.4. 
Random network, small-world network, and scale-free network are generated with the 
same size and average node degree. Two Facebook friend networks are collected from 
real Facebook accounts, which exhibit different size and average node degree.
Table 5.4: The Properties of Networks in the Simulation
N e tw o r k S iz e A v e r a g e  N o d e  D e g re e
Random  network 100 4
Small-world network 100 4
Scale-free network 100 4
F B I 151 15.0
F B 2 502 49.0
In Figure 5.1, the visualized graphs for the random, small-world, and scale- 
free networks are shown. The visualized graphs for the Facebook friend networks are 
depicted in Figure 5.2. The Facebook graphs (FBI and FB2) are obtained using the 
SocialMediaData function in Mathematica. Figure 5.2a and Figure 5.2b are from two 
different Facebook accounts.
(a) Random network (b) Small-world network (c) Scale-free network
Figure 5.1: The network topologies used in the simulations. The average node 
degree for each network is 4, and each network includes 100 nodes.
( a )  F B I  ( b )  F B 2
Figure 5.2: The Facebook friend networks used in the simulations. Network FBI 
and FB2 are comprised of 151 and 502 nodes, respectively.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Two-user Game
The Nash equilibria for the two user games in both the risk-included and 
risk-free scenarios are shown in Figure 5.3. The Nash equilibria correspond to the 
privacy decisions that the two users are likely to make. By definition, no user can 
increase his/her gain by changing his/her strategy unilaterally when Nash equilibrim 
is attained. The Nash equilibrium states are calculated using the enumerating extreme
points method [44] as calculated by the Gambit tool [45]. The states represent all the 
possible final strategies employed by a risk-included or risk-free simulation. Figure 5.3 
shows a total of 31 Nash equilibrium states, six of which are attained in the risk-free 
scenario, and 25 in the risk-included scenario. The states are represented with color- 
coded rectangles which correspond to the probability of a player taking that strategy. 
Darker colors correspond to higher probabilities while lighter colors correspond to 
lower probabilities. For example, State 25 of the risk-included scenario shows that 
both Player 1 and Player 2 choose strategy 1 with a probability 1.0. State 2 of the 
risk-included scenario shows that Player 1 could choose either strategy 7 or strategy 8  
while Player 2 chooses strategy 1. Recall that Strategy i refers to the user’s choice to 
reveal i — 1 attributes and therefore Player 1 choosing strategy 1 means they choose 
to withhold all their attributes.
The risk-included states show that Nash Equilibrium is only achieved when 
at least one of the players selects Strategy 1 . All 25 equilibrium states involve at 
least one of the players employing Strategy 1 , which corresponds to withholding all 
his/her attributes. This means that no player will be satisfied with his/her choice 
until at least one of them has chosen to withhold all their attributes. However, one 
player selecting to withhold all their attributes does not mean that the other player 
will choose the same strategy. For example, in State 2, Player 1 chooses to reveal six 
or seven of his seven attributes (strategy 7 or 8 ) with a probability of §|§ and §|§,s 
respectively.
The risk-free states show that players are more likely to reveal more attributes.
Only one of the six equilibrium states has any player withholding any information
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Player 1
With risk
Player 2
0.5 5
Without risk
i 1---------1---------1---------1— i
Strategies
Figure 5.3: The correlation map shows the Nash equilibrium states for the two- 
player game with the colors corresponding to the probability of any user taking a 
specific strategy when Nash equilibrium is attained. Dark colors represent higher 
probabilities, and lighter colors represent lower probabilities.
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(State 6 ). All remaining five states have at least one of the players revealing a 
minimum of six out of seven attributes. For example, State 3 shows that both Player 
1 and Player 2 choose Strategy 8 , which is the reveal-all strategy.
The results show that with risk involved, equilibrium will only be attained if 
at least one of the players selects to withhold all his attributes. In a risk-free scenario, 
however, a player will only withhold all attributes if the other player has withheld all 
their attributes. Otherwise, both players are comfortable with revealing either all or 
all-but-one of their attributes.
5.2.2 Basic Evolutionary Game
The population dynamics for the basic evolutionary game model are shown 
in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 for the risk-included and risk-free cases, respectively. 
The figures show how many users employ the different possible strategies and how 
this changes with time. By considering an 80-user network, and solving the system of 
differential equations for different values of motivation a, we are able to determine the 
number of users n* that choose to reveal i attributes. For example, no is the number 
of users who choose to withhold all their attributes (reveal 0  attributes), while n 7 is 
the number of users who choose to reveal all seven attributes. Initially, ten users are 
assigned to each strategy, i.e. n* =  10, Vi € {0 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 , 7}.
From Figure 5.4 we observe that the number of people who withhold all their 
attributes no increases to 80 in all three plots, while all other strategies decrease to 0 . 
This shows that as long as there is risk in the network, the final strategy employed 
by all users is to withhold all the attributes.
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xIO
0.006
t
0.008 0.010.002 0.004
( a )  a  =  0 .2 , e =  5 .0
c*  40
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.3 0.5 0.6 0.70.1 0.2
( b )  a  =  0 .9 , e =  5 .0
( c )  a  =  1.5, e =  5 .0
Figure 5.4: Population dynamics for the basic evolutionary game for the risk- 
included scenario with different levels of motivation.
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( a )  a  — 0 .2 , e =  5 .0
-*•n,
C
t
( b )  a  =  0 .9 , e =  5 .0
c
t
( c )  a  =  1 .5 , e =  5 .0
Figure 5.5: Population dynamics for the basic evolutionary game for the risk-free 
scenario with different levels of motivation.
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However, comparing Figures. 5.4a, 5.4b, and 5.4c shows that increasing the 
motivation a  increases the time it takes for the network to eventually employ the 
withhold-all strategy. For example, comparing Figures. 5.4a and 5.4b shows that 
increasing a from 0.2 to 0.9 results in an increase in convergence time from 0.012 
to 0.7. This indicates that an increase in the motivation to reveal more attributes 
only affects how long it takes for the network to eventually employ the withhold-all 
strategy. It is interesting to note that the reveal-one-attribute strategy rq is initially 
more common than the more revealing strategies (n<i,n3 , n4, n^, t i q , n7).
In contrast, we observe from Figure 5.5 that the dominant strategy in the 
risk-free case is to reveal all attributes n7. The number of people who reveal all- 
but-one attribute n6 also initially increases but eventually decreases alongside other 
less revealing strategies (n0, n i ,n 2,n 3 ,n 4 ,n 5). While this result might seem intuitive, 
the effect of increasing motivation is counter-intuitive. Figures. 5.5a, 5.5b, and 5.5c 
show that increasing the motivation increases the time the network takes to achieve 
equilibrium. For example, comparing Figures. 5.5a and 5.5b shows that increasing a  
from 0.2 to 0.9 results in an increase in convergence time from 2.5 to 7. Similar to 
the risk-included case, increasing motivation only affects the convergence time of the 
network. However, increasing the motivation also reduces the number of users who 
will initially employ the reveal all-but-one strategy n6. This means that the reveal 
all-but-one strategy is more popular with lower values of motivation.
Comparing convergence times of the risk-free and risk-included networks shows 
that risk-free networks have longer convergence time than risk-included networks for 
low values of a, and a shorter convergence time for a  =  1.5.
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5.2.3 Weighted Evolutionary Model
In this section, we describe the results derived from simulations of the weighted 
evolutionary game on a random network, a small-world network, a scale-free network, 
and two Facebook friend networks.
The attribute dynamic curves for random network, small-world network, scale- 
free network, FBI, and FB2 are shown in Figures. 5.6 - 5.15, respectively. Each 
dynamic curve shows how the proportion of the entire population that discloses any 
specific attribute changes with time. Each dynamic plot consists of seven curves 
corresponding to seven attributes, A ttr#  1 , A ttr# 2, ..., Attr#7, which are numbered 
according to their importance (weight), i.e. A ttr#7  is the most important attribute, 
while Attrjfcl is the least important attribute.
There are three sub-figures (Figures, a-c) in each figure. Figures. 5.6, 5.8, 5.10, 
5.12, and 5.14 correspond to the simulation results when we consider the benefit and 
risk only within the users’ friends. Figures. 5.7, 5.9, 5.11, 5.13, and 5.15 correspond 
to simulation results when we consider both the users’ friends and friends-of-friends. 
The top, middle and bottom rows correspond to B R R  values of 1 : 0, 1 : 15, and 
1 : 30, respectively, where (B R R  = 1 : 0 )  represents risk-free scenario.
The first observation is a general reduction in attribute revelation with an 
increase in risk. Consider Figure 5.6 which shows the attribute dynamics in a random 
network: comparing Figures. 5.6a, 5.6b, and 5.6c shows that increasing the risk causes 
less users to reveal attributes. Figure 5.6a shows that over 85% of the population 
reveal all their attributes by 100 iterations when there is no risk. Introducing risk 
causes users to reveal less attributes. In fact, Figure 5.6c shows that all users withhold
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all their attributes by 50 iterations when B R R  =  1 : 30. The small-world, scale-free, 
and Facebook networks (cf. Figures. 5.8, 5.10, 5.12, and 5.14) all exhibit similar 
observations. While this observation might seem intuitive, it provides some form of 
vindication for our model.
The second observation is that the networks generally exhibit larger drops in 
attribute revelation when the range of influence is restricted to friends as opposed to 
when friends-of-friends are also considered. For example, Figures. 5.8a and 5.9a show 
almost identical levels of revelation without risk. However, increasing the risk leads 
to more attributes withholding in Figures. 5.8b and 5.8c than it does in Figures. 5.9b 
and 5.9c. This means that risk plays a more dominant role in attribute disclosure 
when only the friends of a user are considered.
The third observation is that increasing the users’ range of influence generally 
results in increased levels of attribute revelation. Consider Figures. 5.10 and 5.11 
which capture attribute dynamics in a scale-free network: comparing Figures. 5.10a, 
5.10b, and 5.10c and Figures. 5.11a, 5.11b, and 5.11c shows that maximum revelation 
is obtained by as early as 40 iterations for all attributes when friends-of-friends are 
considered (Figures. 5.11a, 5.11b, 5.11c). In contrast, the risk-free scenario with 
friends (Figure 5.10a) only obtains maximum revelation for some of the attributes, 
while Figures. 5.10b and 5.10c do not obtain maximum revelation for any attributes 
at all. This observation can be attributed to the process of enlarging the influential 
range. Increasing the range results in an increase in the number of users who can 
hide any specific user which leads to a reduction in risk. Increasing the range also
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allows for more users who share the same attributes, which leads to an increase in 
the user’s benefit.
The next observation is related to the friend’s influential range. Increasing the 
risk factor has a larger effect on attribute disclosure in the random and small-world 
networks than in the scale-free and Facebook networks. Comparing Figures. 5.6 
and 5.8 to Figures. 5.10, 5.12 and 5.14 shows that B R R  =  1 : 30 causes complete 
attribute withholding in the random and small-world networks in contrast to partial 
attribute withholding in the scale-free and Facebook networks.
The final observation is related to the effect of network topology on attribute 
disclosure with the range of influence restricted to friends. We find that network 
topology plays a more considerable effect on the privacy in risk-included scenarios 
than in a risk-free scenario for the random, small-world, and scale-free networks. 
Comparing Figures. 5.6a, 5.8a and 5.10a shows that the networks exhibit similar 
performance in the risk-free environment (B RR  = 1 : 0 ) .  However, comparing 
Figures. 5.6b, 5.8b and 5.10b as well as Figures. 5.6c, 5.8c and 5.10c shows that 
the performance is different for different networks. For example, Figures. 5.6c and 
5.8c show complete attribute withholding while Figure 5.10c shows partial attribute 
disclosure.
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Figure 5.6: Attribute dynamics for the weighted evolutionary game in random
network, where the influential range of the utility function includes Friends.
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Figure 5.7: Attribute dynamics for the weighted evolutionary game in random
network, where the influential range of the utility function includes Friends and
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Figure 5.8: Attribute dynamics for the weighted evolutionary game in small-world
network, where the influential range of the utility function includes Friends.
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Figure 5.9: Attribute dynamics for the weighted evolutionary game in small-world
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Figure 5.10: Attribute dynamics for the weighted evolutionary game in scale-free
network, where the influential range of the utility function includes Friends.
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Figure 5.11: Attribute dynamics for the weighted evolutionary game in scale-free
network, where the influential range of the utility function includes Friends and
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Figure 5.12: Attribute dynamics for the weighted evolutionary game in FBI, where
the influential range of the utility function includes Friends.
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Figure 5.13: Attribute dynamics for the weighted evolutionary game in FBI, where
the influential range of the utility function includes Friends and Friends-of-Friends.
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Figure 5.14: Attribute dynamics for the weighted evolutionary game in FB2, where
the influential range of the utility function includes Friends.
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Figure 5.15: Attribute dynamics for the weighted evolutionary game in FB2, where
the influential range of the utility function includes Friends and Friends-of-Friends.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, we model and analyze the privacy settings of social networks 
from a game-theoretic perspective by introducing three types of game models. The 
models aim to investigate the influence of various factors on the privacy settings 
employed in social networks. The first is a two-user game model, which investigates 
the relationship between two users when disclosing profile attributes. The second is 
the basic evolutionary game model, which shows the dynamic behavior of multiple 
users as in large-scale online social networks. The third is a weighted evolutionary 
game model. We aim to investigate the influence of various factors such as attribute 
importance, benefit, risk, and network topology on the privacy settings employed in 
social networks.
As for results, we find both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in the two-user 
game. We also show the dominant strategy and population dynamics for the basic and 
weighted evolutionary game models in both the risk-included and risk-free cases. The 
two-user model results show that in a risk-included environment, Nash equilibrium 
is only achieved when at least one of the users withholds all their attributes. In the 
risk-free environment, results show that the ultimate privacy settings selected by one 
user is highly dependent on the privacy settings selected by another user.
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In the basic evolutionary model, results indicate that the presence or absence 
of risk affects the final strategy adopted by the users in a network, while motivation 
only affects how long they take to adopt that strategy. This means that increasing 
motivation in a social network, e.g. by improving friend recommendation algorithms, 
only affects the level of self-disclosure in the short term. The existence of any risk 
factor means that eventually all users of a social network will adopt the highest 
possible privacy regardless of the benefits of revealing more profile attributes.
In the weighted evolutionary model, the results show that the most important 
attributes exhibit higher levels of revelation than the least important attributes. 
This finding is more evident in random and scale-free networks than in small-world 
networks. We also find that increasing the risk exhibits limited effect on the privacy 
dynamics of the network if we consider the benefit and risk from friends-of-friends. In 
the Facebook friend networks, which include more users and feature a higher average 
node degree, increasing the risk coefficient only slightly affects the level of attribute 
disclosure.
The models presented in this dissertation provide a way to study and compre­
hend the dynamics of privacy settings in social networks. Additionally, the nature 
of the transitions reveals the influence of certain factors in the short and long run in 
social network privacy to social network designers and users.
For future work, we plan to investigate the performance of our model on a 
larger variety of networks as well as compare it with data from real world social 
networks. Moreover, we intend to investigate multi-level privacy where users reveal 
different sets of attributes to different users in the network.
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